

Bristol Bay Set Gillnet  
Permit  
Stacking

serving fishing families. Table 4 describes the source of the second permit for year-end permit holdings, regardless of when they acquired the second permit. Almost half of the second permits held by year-end permit holders came from immediate family members. Among locals, a smaller percentage (between 11.1% and 16.7%) of permits came from individuals without association, whereas for nonlocals and nonresidents a higher proportion of the permits were sourced from persons other than family members or friends (between 29.6% and 36.4%).

Table 5 describes all permanent S04T permit transfers for the year and indicates the relationship between the transferor and transfer recipient. This includes permits used in both stacked and single permit operations. While it differs by showing transfers rather than holdings as Table 4 designates, it does provide information as to the rates of transfer among all permits.

**Table 4. Source of Second Permanent Permit for Individuals with Two Permits at Year-end**

Year	Residency	Total No. of Persons with Stacked Permits		Friend/ Partner		Immediate Family		Other Relative		Other	
2010	Local	9	16.4%	2	22.2%	4	44.4%	2	22.2%	1	11.1%
	Nonlocal	27	49.1%	4	14.8%	13	48.1%	2	7.4%	8	29.6%
	Nonresident	19	34.5%	3	15.8%	10	52.6%	0	0.0%	6	31.6%
	<b>Total 2010</b>	<b>55</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>16.4%</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>49.1%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7.3%</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>27.3%</b>
2011	Local	12	12.6%	2	16.7%	5	41.7%	3	25.0%	2	16.7%
	Nonlocal	39	41.1%	5	12.8%	20	51.3%	2	5.1%	12	30.8%
	Nonresident	44	46.3%	9	20.5%	19	43.2%	0	0.0%	16	36.4%
	<b>Total 2011</b>	<b>95</b>		<b>16</b>	<b>16.8%</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>46.3%</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5.3%</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>31.6%</b>

**Table 5. Relationship of Transferors to Transfer Recipients by Year for All S04T Transfers**

Year	Total	Friend/ Partner		Immediate Family		Other Relative		Other	
2010	125	18	14.4%	61	48.8%	11	8.8%	35	28.0%
2011	107	21	19.6%	47	43.9%	8	7.5%	31	29.0%
1980-2011	2,945	605	20.5%	1,170	39.7%	208	7.1%	962	32.7%

\* Transfer survey information is not included for permit foreclosures. However, subsequent transfers of these permits are included in the "other" category.

From Table 5-1 Changes in the Distribution of Alaska's Commercial Fisheries Entry Permits, 1975-2011 for S04T permits

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## Fishery Performance

Table 6 reports on the amount of nominal ex-vessel value from various classes of fishing operations. At first glance, it appears that ex-vessel values for each residency class are somewhat proportional from 2008 to 2011. In 2008, locals earned 35.9% of total ex-vessel value, in 2009 it was 35.2%, 36.4% in 2010 and 37.7% in 2011. Similar aggregate earnings are realized for nonlocals and nonresidents.

**Table 6. Nominal Ex-vessel Value for Individuals by Residency and Single/Stacked Operations, 2008-2011**

Year	Residency	Operation Type	Individuals	Ex-Vessel Value	Average Ex-vessel Value	Individuals	Ex-Vessel Value
2008	Local	Single	307	\$7,555,755	\$24,612	35.9%	36.1%
	Nonlocal	Single	267	\$6,267,329	\$23,473	31.3%	29.9%
	Nonresident	Single	280	\$7,132,610	\$25,474	32.8%	34.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>854</b>	<b>\$20,955,694</b>	<b>\$24,538</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
2009	Local	Single	302	\$8,268,507	\$27,379	35.2%	31.5%
	Nonlocal	Single	273	\$8,177,398	\$29,954	31.8%	31.2%
	Nonresident	Single	283	\$9,765,994	\$34,509	33.0%	37.3%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>858</b>	<b>\$26,211,898</b>	<b>\$30,550</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
2010	Local	Single	277	\$9,281,011	\$33,505	33.9%	29.9%
		Stacked	20	\$1,388,736	\$69,437	2.5%	4.5%
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>\$10,669,747</b>	<b>\$35,925</b>	<b>36.4%</b>	<b>34.4%</b>
	Nonlocal	Single	216	\$6,642,671	\$30,753	26.5%	21.4%
		Stacked	27	\$2,368,459	\$87,721	3.3%	7.6%
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>\$9,011,130</b>	<b>\$37,083</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>29.0%</b>
	Nonresident	Single	255	\$9,500,259	\$37,256	31.3%	30.6%
		Stacked	21	\$1,840,943	\$87,664	2.6%	5.9%
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>\$11,341,203</b>	<b>\$41,091</b>	<b>33.8%</b>	<b>36.6%</b>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>\$25,423,941</b>	<b>\$33,989</b>	<b>91.7%</b>	<b>82.0%</b>
		<b>Stacked</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>\$5,598,139</b>	<b>\$82,326</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>18.0%</b>
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>816</b>	<b>\$31,022,079</b>	<b>\$38,017</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
2011	Local	Single	284	\$8,987,217	\$31,645	35.7%	32.8%
		Stacked	16	\$1,070,626	\$66,914	2.0%	3.9%
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>\$10,057,843</b>	<b>\$33,526</b>	<b>37.7%</b>	<b>36.8%</b>
	Nonlocal	Single	192	\$5,279,503	\$27,497	24.2%	19.3%
		Stacked	43	\$2,852,534	\$66,338	5.4%	10.4%
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>\$8,132,037</b>	<b>\$34,604</b>	<b>29.6%</b>	<b>29.7%</b>
	Nonresident	Single	219	\$6,675,071	\$30,480	27.5%	24.4%
		Stacked	41	\$2,499,719	\$60,969	5.2%	9.1%
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>\$9,174,790</b>	<b>\$35,288</b>	<b>32.7%</b>	<b>33.5%</b>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>695</b>	<b>\$20,941,791</b>	<b>\$30,132</b>	<b>87.4%</b>	<b>76.5%</b>
		<b>Stacked</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>\$6,422,879</b>	<b>\$64,229</b>	<b>12.6%</b>	<b>23.5%</b>
		<b>Combined</b>	<b>795</b>	<b>\$27,364,670</b>	<b>\$34,421</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>




Note, however, the number of locals participating in the fishery remains relatively constant while the overall number of nonlocals and nonresidents has declined. Table 7 and Figure 4 depict the reduction in latent permits as they are pulled into the fishery to create stacked permit operations.

**Table 7. Counts of Permits used in Fishing Operations**

Year	Total Permits Fished	Year End Permits	% Permits Fished
2008	850	979	86.8%
2009	843	982	85.8%
2010	868	982	88.4%
2011	889	981	90.6%


**Figure 4. S04T Latent Permits**



It should also be noted that the average income for individuals with permit stacking operations is more than twice that of single permit operations.

It would seem logical that overall, individuals who are more capable of making landings would be in a better position to invest some of their earnings into making their operations more profitable by purchasing a second permit, as they would be more likely to have additional capital from their earnings. While average ex-vessel value is one metric of performance, there still exists a wide range of earnings across individuals. Figure 5 shows data from Table 8, which outlines average ex-vessel earnings by quartile.

Quartile 1 is the bottom 25% of earners, while quartile 4 shows the top 25% of individuals. The higher sets of lines are average earnings among stacked permit holders, and the lower set of lines are from individuals who only made landings with a single permit. While one would expect a varying array of both skill and luck in landing fish, it is interesting that the earnings across quartiles among each of the residency classes



are evenly distributed. This suggests that individuals from each of the residency classes are fairly comparable in their ability to make landings. While earnings for each quartile may be fairly consistent across residency class, there still remain substantial differences in the counts of individuals stacking permits by residency classes. Given the same opportunity, the distribution of locals, nonlocals, and nonresidents in terms of ability to make landings appears equal.

**Table 8. Quartile Earnings**

2010 Quartile	Local				Nonlocal				Nonresident			
	Single		Stacked		Single		Stacked		Single		Stacked	
	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count
1	\$9,389	70	\$19,995	5	\$6,754	54	\$29,638	7	\$7,509	64	\$48,274	5
2	\$23,855	70	\$42,917	5	\$18,226	54	\$54,087	7	\$21,850	64	\$66,699	5
3	\$36,174	70	\$54,711	5	\$32,297	54	\$103,972	7	\$37,740	64	\$86,700	5
4	\$65,986	67	\$160,124	5	\$65,734	54	\$175,763	6	\$82,626	63	\$138,763	6


  

2011 Quartile	Local				Nonlocal				Nonresident			
	Single		Stacked		Single		Stacked		Single		Stacked	
	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count	Value	Count
1	\$10,670	71	\$19,350	4	\$5,290	48	\$29,033	11	\$7,324	55	\$23,483	11
2	\$22,739	71	\$48,968	4	\$17,161	48	\$49,318	11	\$19,333	55	\$41,939	11
3	\$33,088	71	\$67,049	4	\$29,700	48	\$70,335	11	\$32,602	55	\$71,890	11
4	\$60,083	71	\$132,290	4	\$57,838	48	\$121,700	10	\$63,257	54	\$123,660	8

Some individuals suggested in their public comments that fishermen would not be harmed by permit stacking because the second permit in a stacked operation would only come from permits already fished. If no latent permits were used for permit stacking and each permit landed an equal number of fish this likely would be true. Figure 4 shows that many latent permits were brought into use since permit stacking went into effect. While permits are homogenous in providing access to the fishery, individuals that hold permits vary in ability to make

landings, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 8. With a lower proportion of locals participating in permit stacking, there is likewise a lower amount of benefits derived to locals. Figure 6 describes Table 9, which outlines the redistribution of landings brought about by permit

**Figure 6. Redistribution Due to Stacking**





stacking. The landings of individuals who fished in both 2008 and 2011 were compared. Residency was determined by the permit holder's 2011 status. While this may be a limited view comparing only two years, other years were observed and results were similar. Table 9 indicates that 33 nonlocals had stacked permit operations in 2011 and also made landings in 2008. This 3.4% of individuals landed 8.1% of all fish in 2008, before stacking, and 11.6% of the fish in 2011. As a result of permit stacking, for the comparison years, both locals and nonresidents landed fewer fish overall while nonlocals landed proportionately more. Each of the single permit operations effectively landed fewer fish as stacked operations increased their share of the landings.

**Table 9. Proportion of Fish Landed Before and After S04T Permit Stacking Regulations**

		People		Number of Fish Landed				
		<i>Count</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>difference</i>
Local	<i>Single</i>	207	21.4%	1,368,131	1,026,407	34.4%	31.9%	-2.4%
	<i>Stacked</i>	13	1.3%	101,734	128,018	2.6%	4.0%	1.4%
	<i>Total</i>	220	38.1%	1,469,865	1,154,425	36.9%	35.9%	-1.0%
Nonlocal	<i>Single</i>	135	14.0%	818,992	614,377	20.6%	19.1%	-1.5%
	<i>Stacked</i>	33	3.4%	322,043	371,340	8.1%	11.6%	3.5%
	<i>Total</i>	168	29.1%	1,141,035	985,717	28.7%	30.7%	2.0%
Nonresident	<i>Single</i>	157	16.3%	1,049,515	754,513	26.4%	23.5%	-2.9%
	<i>Stacked</i>	33	3.4%	319,085	317,985	8.0%	9.9%	1.9%
	<i>Total</i>	190	32.9%	1,368,600	1,072,498	34.4%	33.4%	-1.0%
<b><i>Total Single</i></b>		<b>499</b>	<b>86.3%</b>	<b>3,236,638</b>	<b>2,395,297</b>	<b>81.3%</b>	<b>74.6%</b>	<b>-6.8%</b>
<b><i>Total Stacked</i></b>		<b>79</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>742,862</b>	<b>817,343</b>	<b>18.7%</b>	<b>25.4%</b>	<b>6.8%</b>


## *New Entrants into the S04T Fishery*

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Public comments to the Board indicated that permit stacking could affect new entrants into the S04T fishery. Opponents voiced concerns to the Board that permit stacking would make it more difficult to enter the fishery due to increases in permit prices or having to buy a second permit to be competitive. Proponents argued that permit stacking would make the fishery more profitable; therefore, more individuals would be enticed to enter the fishery.

New entrants are defined herein as individuals who record a landing on an S04T permit for the first time. Prior to permit stacking, on average just over 10% of the permit holders were new entrants between 1992 and 2011. In 2010, the rate dropped to 8.3%, and went to a historic low of 6% in 2011.

**Figure 7. New Entrants into the S04T Fishery**



**Table 10. New Entrants into the S04T Fishery**

Year	Local			Nonlocal			Nonresident			Total S04T		
	New	Total	% New	New	Total	% New	New	Total	% New	New	Total	% New
1992	34	455	7.5%	41	292	14.0%	35	251	13.9%	110	998	11.0%
1993	44	451	9.8%	39	292	13.4%	19	246	7.7%	103	989	10.4%
1994	43	435	9.9%	30	272	11.0%	35	245	14.3%	109	952	11.4%
1995	41	448	9.2%	41	292	14.0%	28	252	11.1%	110	992	11.1%
1996	35	421	8.3%	35	291	12.0%	45	247	18.2%	116	959	12.1%
1997	33	406	8.1%	31	290	10.7%	26	250	10.4%	90	946	9.5%
1998	23	394	5.8%	27	273	9.9%	29	249	11.6%	79	916	8.6%
1999	21	386	5.4%	31	296	10.5%	32	249	12.9%	84	931	9.0%
2000	28	370	7.6%	30	297	10.1%	38	266	14.3%	96	933	10.3%
2001	26	334	7.8%	27	265	10.2%	22	243	9.1%	75	842	8.9%
2002	22	286	7.7%	19	186	10.2%	29	211	13.7%	70	683	10.2%
2003	23	301	7.6%	21	229	9.2%	22	237	9.3%	67	767	8.7%
2004	30	294	10.2%	28	247	11.3%	32	256	12.5%	91	797	11.4%
2005	35	308	11.4%	33	264	12.5%	27	262	10.3%	95	834	11.4%
2006	34	317	10.7%	33	263	12.5%	47	274	17.2%	114	854	13.3%
2007	27	309	8.7%	28	260	10.8%	32	278	11.5%	87	847	10.3%
2008	22	307	7.2%	29	267	10.9%	34	280	12.1%	85	854	10.0%
2009	19	302	6.3%	43	273	15.8%	28	283	9.9%	90	858	10.5%
2010	17	297	5.7%	25	243	10.3%	26	276	9.4%	68	816	8.3%
2011	20	300	6.7%	9	235	3.8%	19	260	7.3%	48	795	6.0%

*New is the count of individuals who made landings for the first time in the S04T fishery*

*Total is the count of all individuals who made landings in the S04T fishery*




## Permit Value

A substantial amount of the discussion on permit stacking has revolved around how the regulations might affect the value of Bristol Bay set gillnet permits. Some persons have hypothesized that permit values would increase, while others have suggested the option would not influence values. Several of the proposals related to permit stacking for the December 2012 Board of Fisheries meeting mentioned that permit values have increased as a result of permit stacking.

Figure 8 illustrates monthly CFEC estimated permit values from January 2008 (prior to stacking) through October 2012, for both the Bristol Bay set gillnet and drift gillnet fisheries. From January 2008 through the end of 2009, Bristol Bay set gillnet permit prices maintained a relatively constant value. However, since January of 2010, when permit stacking was allowed, the fair market value of set gillnet permits rose 64.2% from \$25,700 to \$42,200. Values for drift gillnet permits fluctuated significantly over the period, while set gillnet permit values rose at a steady rate since permit stacking. Over the same period, drift gillnet permits also rose in value, from \$83,000 to \$96,700, which is a 16.5% increase.

**Figure 8. Bristol Bay Salmon Permit Value**





**Table 11. Nominal Bristol Bay Salmon Permit Value by Month**

Month	S03T	S04T	Month	S03T	S04T	Month	S03T	S04T
Jan-08	\$86,100	\$28,000	Sep-09	\$76,600	\$28,000	May-11	\$149,900	\$34,100
Feb-08	\$88,300	\$28,300	Oct-09	\$78,300	\$28,600	Jun-11	\$153,100	\$35,000
Mar-08	\$90,900	\$27,000	Nov-09	\$79,400	\$28,600	Jul-11	\$155,800	\$36,000
Apr-08	\$89,300	\$27,700	Dec-09	\$82,500	\$27,600	Aug-11	\$160,600	\$37,600
May-08	\$88,800	\$27,900	Jan-10	\$83,000	\$25,700	Sep-11	\$156,300	\$42,500
Jun-08	\$88,600	\$27,400	Feb-10	\$85,300	\$27,000	Oct-11	\$138,800	\$40,700
Jul-08	\$89,400	\$27,100	Mar-10	\$86,000	\$27,300	Nov-11	\$131,900	\$39,600
Aug-08	\$91,500	\$26,700	Apr-10	\$91,300	\$27,800	Dec-11	\$119,500	\$37,000
Sep-08	\$94,100	\$27,600	May-10	\$93,400	\$28,400	Jan-12	\$118,200	\$37,800
Oct-08	\$93,200	\$27,600	Jun-10	\$96,200	\$28,700	Feb-12	\$118,600	\$38,500
Nov-08	\$88,900	\$27,600	Jul-10	\$100,700	\$28,300	Mar-12	\$119,500	\$38,800
Dec-08	\$87,700	\$27,600	Aug-10	\$109,300	\$28,800	Apr-12	\$119,100	\$38,900
Jan-09	\$85,800	\$27,400	Sep-10	\$113,600	\$29,200	May-12	\$117,800	\$39,200
Feb-09	\$84,700	\$28,100	Oct-10	\$116,800	\$31,200	Jun-12	\$115,500	\$40,100
Mar-09	\$82,900	\$28,400	Nov-10	\$116,700	\$30,400	Jul-12	\$114,600	\$40,100
Apr-09	\$79,300	\$28,700	Dec-10	\$123,300	\$31,600	Aug-12	\$114,100	\$40,900
May-09	\$76,900	\$29,000	Jan-11	\$126,200	\$31,000	Sep-12	\$105,500	\$42,500
Jun-09	\$75,400	\$28,500	Feb-11	\$128,800	\$30,800	Oct-12	\$96,700	\$42,200
Jul-09	\$75,200	\$28,400	Mar-11	\$135,300	\$32,800			
Aug-09	\$74,900	\$27,700	Apr-11	\$142,100	\$32,100			

In addition to observing trends in estimated permit values, a regression model was developed to consider changes in permit value due to permit stacking. The model used all real (adjusted for inflation) permit prices from sale transactions between 1980 and 2011.

The model's coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) produced a value of 0.78. This means that 78% of the variation in permit prices from 1980 to 2011 is explained by the model. The model suggests that permit stacking with a sunset date increased the value of a permit by \$14,685. For every pound of salmon landed by the salmon set gillnet fishery, the model suggests that permit value increases \$0.000451. In 2010, over 34 million pounds were harvested, and in 2011 the amount was more than 25 million pounds, so this amount is substantial. The model also indicates that for each metric ton of farmed Atlantic salmon that is produced, the value of an S04T permit drops more than a nickel.

**Table 12. Model Values Output**

Variable	Coefficient
<i>Intercept</i>	\$78,855
<i>Total Pounds Landed</i>	\$0.000451
<i>Permit Stacking</i>	\$14,685
<i>Metric Ton Farmed Atlantic Salmon</i>	-\$0.0513

Data for the model and additional output can be found in Appendix C. While individual sales transactions cannot be represented in this paper due to reasons of confidentiality, a boxplot representing permit value depicts measures of central tendency and dispersion among actual permit sales.

## *Conclusion*

Permit stacking from 2010 to 2012 in the Bristol Bay salmon set gillnet fishery has brought about many changes in the fishery. Nonlocals and nonresidents have a higher rate of participation in permit stacking operations than locals. Permit stacking brings permits out of latency, thus increasing the number of permits used; however, the number of individuals fishing has substantially decreased with the exception of local fishermen. Limited data suggests that stacked permit operations reallocate harvests across residency classes in Bristol Bay. Since implementation of permit stacking, the number of new entrants into the S04T fishery has declined. The estimated value for the S04T permit has significantly increased as a result of permit stacking.

